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JERUSALEM’'S SEPARATION WALL AND GLOBAL 
MESSAGE BOARD: 
GRAFFITI, MURALS, AND THE ART OF SUMUD
By Craig Larkin
All this graffiti that you see on the wall, even when it’s not political, 
is not an act of adjustment. It’s an act of resistance! 
  Shopkeeper from East Jerusalem, 9 February 2011
Israel’s “security fence” (geder ha-hafrada) or Palestine’s “apartheid wall” 
(jidar al-faşl al-‘unşuri)1 currently covers 708 kilometers, annexes 9.4 percent 
of The West Bank, integrates eighty Israeli settlements, and separates about 
fifty-five thousand Palestinian Jerusalemites from their kin in East Jerusalem. 
The barrier’s construction continues to provoke a wide range of resistance 
discourses, international protests, and solidarity campaigns.2 A plethora of 
scholarship and media coverage has sought to challenge the wall’s legality,3 
highlighting its associated human rights violations through the obstruction 
of access to jobs, public services, education, and family. Other reports turn 
attention to the effects of dispossession and territorial fragmentation on 
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Palestinian communities and a future Palestinian state.4 Academic critiques 
have firmly situated the wall within broader theories of state power, violence, 
and securitization. Such studies employ Foucauldian concepts of “biopower” 
or “biopolitics” as a means of understanding population control. They also 
draw on Agamben’s notion of the dystopic “state of exception,” in which a 
sovereign power invokes the need for security to justify the suspension of 
law, political rights, and, ultimately, “bare life” itself.5 
 While Palestinian popular resistance to the wall has taken multiple 
forms and engaged various strategies, it is largely characterized by local 
responses to the wall’s incremental progress. Such responses have included 
mass protests, weekly marches, sit-ins obstructing Israeli bulldozers, the 
dismantling of sections of the barrier, formal legal petitions, and advocacy 
campaigns. Against the backdrop of a weakened Palestinian Authority 
(PA) and continuing Fatah-Hamas infighting, this “Intifada of the Fence”6 
has relied on the formation of local popular committees, the involvement 
of Israeli left-wing activists––mainly Anarchists Against the Wall (AAtW) 
and Ta‘ayush––and the coordination of the grassroots Palestinian Anti-
Apartheid Wall Campaign (AAWC or “Stop the Wall”).7 The AAWC has 
emerged as one of the leading catalysts for wall resistance, facilitating the 
work of fifty-four popular committees, and coordinating national action 
days and weekly demonstrations in villages such as Bil‘in, Ni‘lin, Budrus, 
and al-Ma‘sara.8 
While these acts of resistance are helping to forge new spaces and 
patterns for civil disobedience and activist partnerships, their impact on 
Palestinian Jerusalemite communities already cut off by the wall is far less 
clear.9 In what ways do such popular campaigns inspire, overlap with, or 
at times replace local activism? The failure to physically divert or stop the 
wall’s construction around East Jerusalem has arguably increased “creative 
resistance strategies” such as putting graffiti, protest art, and commercial 
advertising on the wall. These oppositional practices employ the wall as both 
a site of public contention and as a space to be reclaimed through text, image, 
and discursive narrative. Indeed, the wall has emerged as a dynamic canvas 
for multilayered local and international visual art, expressing marginalized 
voices, political criticism, social protest, and global solidarity through graf-
fiti tags, slogans, murals, and posters. Through such diverse interventions, 
protesters invoke humor, hope, and irony in order to help Palestinians adapt 
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and survive.10 It is important, however, to question whether such practices 
may inadvertently reify the wall’s presence and permanence, and equally, 
whether they encourage Western graffiti artists and international peace activ-
ists to further the physical and discursive colonization of Palestinian space. 
In this article, I will examine the relevance and efficacy of wall protest 
art as an expression of everyday resistance or sumud within Palestinian 
Jerusalemite society. Sumud is generally translated as “steadfastness” or 
“rootedness” and is interpreted as a conventional form of nonviolent resist-
ance or resilience. While wall graffiti has sparked a new wave of media 
interest, more attention is directed by media producers to the murals of 
international street artists and the slogans of peace activists and “conflict” 
tourists.11 This article departs from this analysis and explores less-studied 
Palestinian graffiti (in both Arabic and English) and wall interventions as 
a dynamic mode of resistance. These works must be socially and histori-
cally situated, as they elicit multiple readings and target a variety of dif-
ferent audiences: local neighborhoods, Palestinian society, the Israeli state, 
and international civil society.12 The distinctions between Palestinian and 
international wall interventions are often blurred, since local voices may 
be part of an international project and foreign artists may rely on local 
collaboration. These groups’ themes and narratives also diverge, however. 
By examining the production of graffiti and protest art and its local and 
global reception, it is possible to delineate a more nuanced and multilayered 
account of Palestinian encounters with the wall. 
Moreover, wall art and graffiti provide useful lenses through which 
to examine the changing modes and limits of Palestinian resistance and to 
connect it to wider mechanisms and everyday practices that rely on what 
Michel de Certeau has called “dispersed, tactical, and makeshift creativity.”13 
Conceptual ambiguity surrounds resistance, traditionally understood as 
public, collective, symbolic, and politically oriented expressions of dissent 
but increasingly inclusive of everyday, hidden, subaltern acts. Palestinian 
sumud is no exception. Echoing James Scott’s notion of “infrapolitics of 
the poor,”14 Palestinians apply sumud to a variety of settings. These range 
from cultural resistance (the maintenance of traditions, poetry, dance, 
and dress) to economic resilience (farming agricultural land, harvesting 
olives, and other micro-enterprises) and ideational resistance (maintaining 
a sense of hope, endurance, and normalcy).15 Some Palestinians embrace 
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sumud as a pragmatic third way between “submissive capitulation...and 
blind, consuming hate.”16 Some critique it for representing a “fatalistic 
passive resistance.”17 Others extol its adaptive capacity in being rooted and 
yet “resisting immobility, the locking down of one’s community.”18 Sumud 
embodies all the tensions and contradictions of polyvalent strategies of 
everyday Palestinian survival. 
Protest art and wall graffiti are certainly one expression of sumud, or 
what literary scholar Tahrir Hamdi calls “creative resistance.” Hamdi writes 
that sumud “entails writing, drawing, documenting the Palestinian narrative, 
[and] creatively shaping a Palestinian experience that would be meaningful 
to the storyteller and his or her audience, and which would enable a mass 
witnessing of that experience, thus keeping the idea of Palestine alive.”19 
The visual interventions on the separation wall both internally narrate the 
“Palestinian experience” and externally bear global witness to the “idea of 
Palestine.” The iconic visual emblems of Palestinian sumud exist alongside 
debates over the future trajectories of Palestinian resistance. My intention 
here is not to make sumud an even more nebulous concept, but to deconstruct 
its sacralization and examine its complex interplay with networks of power 
relations, for as Foucault reminds us, “resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power.”20
This article emerges from four years of ethnographic research and site 
observations carried out along various sections of the wall around greater 
Jerusalem between 2009 and 2012. The newly segregated suburbs of Abu Dis, 
al-Ram, al-‘Izariyya, Shu‘fat camp, and Bethlehem on which I focus reflect 
diverse urban realities, shaped by population shifts, commercial collapse, 
and new social challenges. The research involved comprehensive photo-
graphic documentation of the sites and over fifty ethnographic interviews 
with Palestinians affected by the wall: shop owners, community leaders, 
students, civil activists, and others. Interviewees were aged between sixteen 
and seventy years old and included thirty-two males and twenty females 
from both Muslim and Christian backgrounds. Methodological tools varied 
as interviews sometimes morphed into personal tours of wall sites, leading 
to informal group discussions and debates on the nature of artistic interven-
tions. After a brief overview of the construction and demographic impact of 
the wall in the Jerusalem suburbs, I will analyze wall interventions ranging 
from protest art to political slogans to commercial advertising.
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Remaking Jerusalem
While the Israeli government has justified the creation of the separation 
wall around East Jerusalem as a “temporary defensive shield”21 in the wake 
of a series of Palestinian suicide bombings, the wall also concretizes Israel’s 
expansive greater metropolitan vision.22 Beginning work in 2002, Israelis 
have constructed in six phases a wall now extending over 142 kilometers in 
length. Its serpentine route envelops the West Bank Israeli settlements of 
Giv’at and Pisgat Ze’ev, Ma’ale Adumim, Gilo, and Gush Etzion (referred to 
as “the Jerusalem Envelope”) while simultaneously severing the Palestinian 
neighborhoods of Bayt Hanina, al-Ram, al-'Izariyya, and Abu Dis from East 
Jerusalem. At certain points, the wall encircles entire Arab communities 
such as Bir Nabala and al-Walaja.23 The collective result is the separation of 
East Jerusalem from its surrounding Arab hinterland, and the creation of 
Palestinian enclaves and exclaves fragmented by roads, buffer zones, and 
walled military checkpoints.24 
The final outcome is not the separation of two ethno-national com-
munities, but what Israeli criminologist Alina Korn has referred to as the 
“ghettoization” of Palestinian communities, imprisoned in marginal spaces:
Map of Greater Jerusalem and the separation wall. Figure 1: Image courtesy of 
Conflict in Cities and the Contested State: Everyday Life and the Possibilities for 
Transformation of Conflict in Belfast, Jerusalem, and Other Divided Cities (CinC).
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Palestinians are often “inside,” trapped in their enclaves and separated 
from other areas or from their lands. Sometimes they are “outside,” 
west of the enclosed area, where their land is trapped within it. Yet at 
other times they are confined in an isolated territory, surrounded by 
fences on three sides—a space which is neither “outside” [n]or “inside.”25
The territorial marginalization of Palestinian Jerusalemites is matched 
by their precarious legal status. Since Israel’s de jure annexation of East 
Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian inhabitants of the city have been conferred 
“permanent residency” status but not citizenship. Instead they are provided 
with Jerusalem ID cards that entitle them to live, travel, and work in Israel 
and receive social services and health insurance benefits. Yet the “perma-
nent residency” of these two hundred and fifty-three thousand Palestinian 
inhabitants is a misnomer. The status is not automatically conferred to the 
holder’s children or spouse and the Israeli authorities can rescind it based 
on failure to prove that Jerusalem is the “center of life.” In the last forty years 
Israeli authorities have revoked fourteen thousand Jerusalem identification 
cards and annulled more than half (fifty-eight percent) of them since the 
construction of the wall.26 
Although humanitarian groups have documented the daily disruptions 
that the wall inflicts on Palestinians, three significant demographic trends 
stand out. The first unintended consequence of the wall is that the Israeli 
attempt to drive East Jerusalemites out of the city has actually resulted in a 
mass influx of Palestinians into East Jerusalem and the Old City. Desperate 
to reside in Israeli-controlled Jerusalem and safeguard their Israeli-issued 
Jerusalem IDs, Palestinians have relocated households and extended families 
to Jerusalem en masse. An estimated thirty to fifty thousand residents27 from 
surrounding neighborhoods such as al-Tur, al-Ram, and Dahiyat al-Barid 
moved into the city, exacerbating overcrowding and leading to inflated 
prices, increased illegal building, and stressing the already thinly stretched 
and underfunded services.28 
The second consequence of the wall is the creation of what we can 
call “dead spaces,” “gray zones,” and suspended enclaves. The route of the 
wall broke up a number of Jerusalem suburbs, cutting off Palestinian com-
munities from their historic links and commercial ties with Jerusalem, and 
virtually draining them of life. The wall’s closure of access roads, shops, 
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and businesses and its devaluation of land and property have transformed 
the previously prosperous metropolitan hubs of al-Ram, Abu Dis, and al-
‘Izariyya into isolated ghettos. In al-Ram, 730 of 1,650 commercial properties 
closed in 2006. In Bir Nabala, fifty percent of shops have closed and 600 
apartments now sit empty.29 The price of a dunum (roughly nine hundred 
square meters) of land in Abu Dis has decreased from eighty thousand to 
forty thousand US dollars.30 
By refusing to build the wall along the 1967 borders, Israel has also 
intentionally generated “gray zones,” or Palestinian neighborhoods that 
were formerly part of the Israeli-controlled Jerusalem municipality but have 
now been excluded by the wall. The Israeli government has abandoned these 
zones, which are not formally incorporated under PA jurisdiction.31 These 
marginal urban districts—Kufr ‘Aqab, Shu‘fat refugee camp, Semiramis, 
and ‘Anata––contain over 55,000 inhabitants and are still rapidly expanding. 
Despite a severe lack of public services, Palestinians are attracted to the 
cheaper living expenses, fewer planning restrictions, and the possibility of 
unofficial family unification that enables Jerusalem ID holders and West 
Bank spouses to live together.32 Yet the lack of regulation and state control 
is exacerbating social problems such as increased unemployment, domestic 
violence, drug abuse, and clan-based violence. According to Nasser Jubran, 
a member of ‘Anata’s residential council, “There is no control here, not by 
Israel and not by the Palestinian Authority. There’s no master. This is going 
to hit Israel like a boomerang, because Hamas might take advantage of this 
vacuum and establish a strong base here and take over the neighborhoods.”33 
Conversely, the wall has also helped create a number of enclaves, 
entrapping 2,500 inhabitants from sixteen West Bank communities on the 
Israeli side of the barrier. These residents do not hold Jerusalem IDs or have 
any legal right to live within the municipal boundaries. A regime of special 
permits severely restricts and regulates their movement, prospects of work, 
and access to services. Permits are required to go to school, sell produce, 
harvest fields, attend hospitals, visit relatives, and worship at holy sites. 
The third overarching consequence of the wall around Jerusalem is 
that it is slowly emerging as a permanent border. It is an unusual border, 
however, as it only applies to certain segments of society. For Jewish Israeli 
settlers, the border is circumvented through bypass roads and unmanned 
checkpoints, thereby allowing Israel to extend its rule and sovereign power 
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in the West Bank.34 Nevertheless, the wall is creating a lasting territorial 
divide between East Jerusalem and the West Bank. It delimits Palestinian 
Jerusalemite expansion and facilitates the larger Israeli goal of driving out 
Palestinians from Jerusalem through an array of discriminatory policies. 
These include house demolitions, confiscation of IDs, settlement expansion, 
and heritage and green zoning envisioned in the “2020 Jerusalem Master 
Plan.”35 These policies have exacerbated a commercial and cultural drift 
from Jerusalem to Ramallah by Palestinian businesses and civil society 
organizations that feel the increasing pressure of the Israeli restrictions. 
The wall has not established internationally recognized Israeli-Palestinian 
national borders. Nonetheless, it is clearly an Israeli attempt to weaken the 
Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and to undermine any future claim to 
the city.
Popular resistance to the construction of the wall in East Jerusalem 
is disjointed and uncoordinated. Initial protests in the form of “freedom 
marches,” solidarity parades, and communal vigils in al-Ram and Abu Dis 
in the summer of 2004 soon dissipated under harsh Israeli retaliation and 
through the lack of PA support. An evolving network of grassroots resistance 
emerged instead in the rural West Bank villages affected by the route of the 
wall—Budrus, Bil‘in, Ni‘lin, al-Ma‘sara, and Jayyous—gradually developing 
into the “Stop the Wall” movement. For Palestinian Jerusalemites, resist-
ance focused on navigating shrinking urban spaces distorted by concrete 
barriers and checkpoints, breaching holes in the wall, and performing 
the tasks of daily life within the city. The risk of losing Jerusalem IDs and 
being left without any citizenship inhibited Palestinians from organizing 
political opposition and direct confrontations with Israeli authorities. While 
Palestinians engage in this “individual” sumud, they also increasingly recog-
nize the importance of engaging an international audience. As a middle-aged 
Jerusalemite political activist now turned political tour guide informed me, 
“The battle against the occupation has shifted from committees to media 
sites. The images of the wall often speak louder than politicians’ voices.”36 
The Art of Resistance
While the separation wall has allowed Israeli authorities to “extend and 
reproduce domination and reinscribe it in space,”37 it has simultaneously 
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become the world’s largest canvas for oppositional protest art, global critique, 
and local resistance. Ever-changing graffiti, murals, posters, installations, 
and street art at urban intersections and militarized checkpoints along the 
wall seek to challenge Israeli hegemony and reclaim Palestinian space, pres-
ence, and subaltern voices. According to William Parry, a British freelance 
journalist and photographer, “The wall has become an enormous visual 
petition, an ephemeral forum, a pictorial rant and reprimand, calling for 
resistance, justice, freedom and solidarity, and a plea for understanding 
and humanity.”38 
A text on the wall bisecting the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Bayt 
Hanina and al-Ram asserts that “Silence is Complicity,” while spray-painted 
graffiti in Abu Dis declares that “words are now our new weapons.” For 
Palestinian artist Husni Radwan, writing on the wall entails a “transmis-
sion of power and challenge” revealing “a state of rebellion against the 
occupation.”39 Sharif Sarhan, a professional photographer and artist from 
Gaza, stressed that a “drawing on the wall plays a major role in resisting the 
occupation, where foreign and Palestinian artists use new and innovative 
ways to confront the occupation.”40 
There exists a rich heritage of Palestinian resistance art from the 1960s 
liberation work of artists such as Isma‘il Shammut, Sulayman Mansur, and 
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Muzayyin who fused the themes of loss, exile, and political 
activism with post-intifada art tackling suffering, and occupation.41 Such 
artists merge the traditional visual icons of land (soil, olive trees, and cactus) 
and people (the fellah, the fighter, and the female figure) with contemporary 
abstraction, deconstruction, and the search for new representative forms. 
In her book Palestinian Art, Israeli art historian Gannit Ankori identifies 
this as “Dis-Orientalism,” the process by which “contemporary Palestinian 
art frequently reflects the hybrid identities of the artists and their ‘fluid’ 
positions in an interstitial space between their oriental matrix and the 
dominant culture of the West.”42 Palestinian activist and dance director 
Omar Barghouti highlights more explicitly Palestinian art’s “decolonizing” 
function as a cultural struggle for emancipation against the Israeli occupa-
tion, and a “self-therapy and expansion of the ‘free zone’ in our collective 
mind, where progressive transformation can thrive.”43
Such liberatory and self-reflexive tropes rarely appear in the narra-
tives of Palestinians with homes and properties facing or encircled by the 
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path of the wall. Their responses to Palestinian wall art are certainly more 
ambivalent and their formulation of resistance more pragmatic. As twenty-
three year old al-Quds University graduate Jamil, living in what he calls the 
“al-Ram ghetto” explains, “Graffiti is not a solution but sometimes it is the 
only way to be heard, to cry out, shout, dream, fight back!”44 Painting on 
the wall also provides a limited escape or release. It is an attempt to project 
an alternative image or message of hope in a situation of total despair. A 
nine-meter wall surrounds the Anastas family’s home and shop, which is 
situated in a residential block adjacent to Rachel’s tomb on the (formerly) 
main Hebron-Jerusalem road in Bethlehem. The colorful graffiti on the wall 
surrounding them depicts an image of a dove with olive branch and the text 
“Anastas want peace.”45 The owners of the Rock Company, a well-established 
Bethlehem jewelry store also flanked by the wall, have painted an idyllic 
beach scene at the back of their commercial property. They dematerialize 
the wall and present a parallel yet illusionary reality.46 
Yet very few Palestinian Jerusalemites appeared convinced of the 
oppositional value or potential of wall graffiti and protest art. They leveled 
their most prominent criticism at the irrelevance of the visual messages in 
stark juxtaposition to the wall’s immutability. Artistic paintings of cracks, 
fissures, doors, and windows that offer glimpses into alternative worlds 
(real or imaginary) cannot subvert the wall’s concrete reality. For some, 
they reveal instead the weakness and impotence of Palestinian resistance. 
As one local resident from Abu Dis explains: 
It’s not the graffiti that matters to me. It is the wall that has been 
affecting my life ever since it was constructed.... What can graffiti do 
about our situation over here? Our rights in this country are gone. 
No one cares. My family owned a shop in Abu Dis, but we had to rent 
another in al-‘Izariyya because of the wall.47
Jerusalemites also direct criticism at Western artists and international 
activists whose protest artwork monopolizes global media and scholarly 
discussion. The wall in Bethlehem has become almost sacralized as a “place 
of pilgrimage” for graffiti artists, activists, and tourists who pay homage 
to the iconic murals or add their own paintings, graffiti, and messages 
of resistance.48 Its popularization owes much to the interventions or “art 
attacks” of British graffiti artist Banksy. Since 2005, Banksy’s satirical 
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paintings and trips to Palestine have helped generate increasing media 
coverage and publicity. His exhibition “Santa’s Ghetto” (2007) encouraged 
other international artists such as Blu, Paul Insect, and Sam3 to paint on 
the wall, and the resulting media exposure raised almost one million dollars 
for local Palestinian charities.
Despite these attempts to demonstrate international solidarity with the 
Palestinian people, locals have received these interventions with consider-
able ambivalence. Locals have effaced or covered paintings that offended 
people’s sensibilities, such as rats with slingshots and a donkey producing 
an ID for an Israeli soldier. Shrewd businessmen have sold others to foreign 
investors.49 In other cases, Palestinians have reinscribed or “Palestinized” 
wall art. As one local youth explains: “Someone bricked up the window 
Banksy painted on the wall. Maybe they didn’t like his work, or the idea of 
a beautiful landscape. For me, the issue is not about rejecting the view but 
whether it’s the right time to imagine it.”50 
Palestinian critics see such interventions as further eroding their sov-
ereignty over their space.51 Some accuse artists of beautifying the wall and 
creating artistic tourism that actually helps legitimate its presence. Others 
worry that such murals do not actually challenge Israeli authority.52 For 
example, Bethlehem residents have recently been critical of two interven-
Figure 2: Banksy’s bricked up panorama, Bethlehem. Image 
from September 2010, courtesy of CinC. 
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tions by French and German street artists. In “Face2Face,” artists JR and 
Marco pasted enlarged photographic portraits of Israelis and Palestinians 
with similar professions facing each other on the wall. The artists’ intention 
was “to show that beyond what separates them, Israelis and Palestinians 
are enough alike to be able to understand one another.”53 Yet for Hani, a 
frustrated mechanic and father of three living close to the wall, these photos 
mean nothing: “Of course we are similar, but we do not have the same 
rights or the same lives.”54 The second piece, a mural by street artist Captain 
Borderline, displays a chained dove of peace alongside Israeli (Jewish) and 
Palestinian figures pointing accusatory fingers and espousing “hate and 
fear” discourses, while an Eastern mystical cross-legged guru is poised to 
cut the bonds and “Release 4 Peace.” The sardonic response of twenty-one 
year old Bethlehem University student Muna reflects the mood of many: 
“Perhaps that’s the answer. We need more Eastern gurus and less politicians, 
and then we [will] arrive at peace.”55 
While the highly publicized work of graffiti artists such as Banksy, Blu, 
and Sam3 engage a global audience and provide a subversive snapshot of 
local realities, they may in some ways obscure the complexity of everyday 
Palestinian responses to the wall. For Hani and Muna, the issue is not 
about understanding or reconciling with the Israeli “other,” but defying the 
occupation and maintaining family networks beyond the wall. Resistance is 
not simply about global justice discourses but about everyday concerns and 
uncomfortable compromises. As a twenty-three year old computer science 
graduate from al-‘Izariyya confides: 
The wall leaves us with impossible choices: to move our home, to rent 
one room for a family of five, to lie to the municipal authorities, to 
borrow.... Do you know how many Jerusalemites are in debt?... You 
hear stories of Palestinian workers who help place the concrete barriers 
in the ground and then they take out spray cans and write “Down 
with the Wall” and “The Wall Must Fall.” How can this be? I suppose 
survival is still the main thing. Money matters.56
Not all residents critical of Israeli power and PA powerlessness dem-
onstrate such resignation. Palestinian wall murals offer dynamic readings 
and reflections on grassroots initiatives such as the solidarity campaign for 
Palestinian hunger strikers in Israeli jails titled “We Can’t Live, So We Are 
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Waiting for Death.” Stenciled images of Khadr ‘Adnan—a hunger striker 
whose sixty-six day fast helped mobilize protests outside Ofer prison and 
throughout the West Bank—appear at various locations along the wall. In 
al-Ram, one tag simply reads “We Are All Khadr ‘Adnan” echoing the chants 
of solidarity demonstrations in Ramallah, Jenin, Bethlehem, Hebron, and 
Gaza in February 2012.57
Wall murals also reflect wider regional movements. An interesting 
example is the more recent attempt to incorporate Palestinian resist-
ance within the unfolding events of the Arab revolts or uprisings. A local 
Palestinian artist, working under the pseudonym Vince Seven (VIN7) 
painted a revolutionary battle scene depicting a future storming of the 
separation wall and the triumphant exaltation of the Palestinian national 
flag on the wall in Bethlehem.58 
Emulating French painter Eugene Delacroix’s Liberty Leading the People, 
the local liberators are cloaked in the emblems of Palestinian struggle: the 
rural jalabiyya, the checked keffiyeh, the catapult, gun, and keys of former 
homes. The caption, “Revolution[s] have started here...and will continue 
Figure 3:  Revolutionary Palestinian mural by Vin7, Bethlehem. 
Image from March 2012, courtesy of CinC. 
147
until... ” is an attempt to interpret the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya 
as both inheritors of the Palestinian revolutionary legacy and simultane-
ously as harbingers of a future Palestinian liberation. The same artist has 
also created a nostalgic iconic image of Palestinian fighter Leila Khalid, a 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) member, infamous 
for her involvement in plane hijackings and resistance activities. Khalid is 
immortalized as a youthful activist in military fatigues, adorned with an 
AK-47, a checkered keffiyeh, and a bullet ring. Amidst the multiple slogans 
of peace, freedom, and liberty, this is a local reminder of the importance 
of armed Palestinian resistance, captured in the tagline “Don’t Forget the 
Struggle.”
Yet at the same time Palestinian wall art can also provoke and challenge 
traditional interpretations and genres, for example Majd ‘Abd al-Hamid’s 
“Declaration of Independence,” a deconstruction of Mahmoud Darwish’s 
1998 Palestinian “Letter of Independence.” Stenciled over a 130-feet portion 
of the wall in al-Ram, the jumbled, fragmented Arabic letters encourage 
multiple readings and diverse interpretations, but they ultimately point 
toward an incoherent and disjointed Palestinian future.59 
Figure 4: Leila Khalid mural, Bethlehem. Image from 
March 2012, courtesy of CinC, March 2012. 
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“Make Peace, Not Walls”: The Politics of Wall Graffiti
I will turn now to further exploring these dissenting Palestinian voices and 
narratives often found in the less-studied parts of the wall. Julie Peteet’s 
insightful exploration of graffiti in East Jerusalem during the first intifada 
underscores three key features.60 First and foremost, Palestinian graffiti was 
an oppositional practice—a public act of defiance, civil disobedience, and 
 Figure 5: Majd Abdul Hamid’s “Declaration of Independence,” 
al-Ram. Image from June 2010, courtesy of CinC. 
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resistance that challenged Israel’s supremacy. Second, graffiti emerged as 
a crucial medium for internal communication in a climate of censure and 
surveillance. It became a way to organize protests, strikes, and rallies; to affirm 
allegiances; to warn against collaboration; and finally, to demarcate political 
boundaries. Thirdly, graffiti helped create an arena of public debate, or what 
Nancy Frazer terms “counterpublics,” in which multiple and contradictory 
subaltern Palestinian voices contest and engage with a local populace.61 As 
Peteet astutely summarizes, “Graffiti [as cultural artifacts] were a critical 
component of a complex and diffuse attempt to overthrow hierarchy.” For 
Palestinians, Peteet continues, “graffiti simultaneously affirmed community 
and resistance, debated tradition, envisioned competing futures, indexed 
historical events and processes and inscribed memory.”62 
Writing on the wall continues to be an act of defiance, it still serves 
as a medium of communication, and it contributes to a dynamic public 
discourse. Both artists and viewers, however, live in a changed political 
context with emergent globalizing forces. There are three ways in which the 
current situation is notably different from that during the first intifada. First, 
the wall has created a de facto (although shifting) Israel-Palestinian border; 
consequently, the Israeli military does not care much about graffiti on the 
Palestinian side. During the first intifada, Israel used fines, imprisonment, 
and forced local youth to erase graffiti. Now there is less intervention. Some 
artists have been especially defiant in spraying graffiti near armed checkpoints, 
security towers, and gates with a military presence. Some artists now include 
with their graffiti personal tags, names, and even telephone numbers. This 
growing transparency may be a sign of new communal boldness perhaps 
evidenced in recent Palestinian graffiti decorating sites in West Jerusalem.63 
Secondly, graffiti is no longer a significant medium of organizing 
or mobilizing communal Palestinian resistance. The emergence of new 
technologies allows for greater connectivity and the evolution of cyber-
resistance—what some have termed an “electronic intifada.” Palestinians not 
only inscribe their messages of resistance on physical sites, but they increas-
ingly digitize and transmit them globally. Palestinian protests and forms of 
communal resistance are now often organized, recorded, and transmitted 
to local and global audiences through websites, blogs, Twitter feeds, email 
updates, social network sites, and YouTube clips. The wall becomes a reposi-
tory for graffiti cyber links and public forums of debate and discourse.64 One 
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website, for example, offers viewers a virtual Israeli-Palestinian separation 
wall they may “tag” and “bomb” with graffiti and protest art.65 
Finally, and most significantly, groups like the International Solidarity 
Movement (ISM) and similar activist networks have increasingly globalized 
the Palestinian conflict. Such groups are committed to bringing the power of 
global solidarity to the on-the-ground struggle against Israeli colonization 
under the mantra, “We Are All Palestinians.”66 As one wall graffiti message 
attests, “Palestine (not Nokia) connects people.” Global activism and indig-
enous responses have converged and even blurred together in the struggle to 
free Palestine of Israeli occupation. John Collins, a scholar of global studies, 
explains this reciprocal phenomenon as “Global Palestine—a Palestine that 
is globalised and a globe that is becoming Palestinized.” Collins situates 
Palestine at the center (symbolically and physically) of wider neocolonial 
processes of securitization, occupation, and acceleration—the ability to 
“control the strategic acceleration and deceleration of violence and change.”67 
Yet amidst the desire to raise international support and bring global pres-
sure to bear on Israel either politically or economically, it is important not 
to lose sight of the specificity and local agency of the Palestinian struggle. 
It is perhaps best to observe the subtle tension of this last point in 
the contrasting themes and emphases that distinguish international graf-
fiti interventions on the wall from that of local Palestinian graffiti. Pacifist 
slogans, idioms, and human rights declarations may offer solidarity but do 
they fundamentally challenge Israeli occupation? 
The two major sites of international wall graffiti are at the Jerusalem 
side of the Abu Dis and al-‘Izariyya divide (formerly Jerusalem-Jericho 
road) and on the exterior side of the Bethlehem wall. The first site, one 
of the earliest sections of the wall constructed in Jerusalem in 2003 and 
the most visible vista from the Old City, was the initial scene of solidarity 
marches. It continues to be a stopping point for tourists and activists on 
“wall tours.” A variety of Palestinian and Israeli non-governmental organiza-
tions and tourist companies (a mixture of peace activists and commercial 
entrepreneurs) currently run approximately nine organized wall tours in 
East Jerusalem. Tours vary dramatically: some are free, while others cost 
as much as thirty-five dollars. Some involve local Palestinians from East 
Jerusalem; other guides merely narrate the indigenous experience. But almost 
all of them stop at this section of the wall. The inscriptions are mostly in 
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English offering messages of solidarity: “Scotland/Ireland/Seattle supports 
Palestine,” “Mancs against Tanks,” and “Algeria is with Palestine, Freedom 
inshallah” (in Arabic); as well as critical commentaries:  “Wall of War + 
Shame = Wailing Wall.” 
The wall in Bethlehem, undoubtedly the most popular site of “conflict 
tourism,” inspires a cacophony of global interventions with many murals 
focusing on forms of escape: ladders, escalators, windows, cracks and fissures, 
and segments of the wall falling like dominos. Palestinian wall paintings in 
the less visited suburbs of al-Ram, Shu‘fat, and al-‘Izariyya mainly rely on 
the traditional emblems of sumud: the rooted olive tree, the sacred al-Aqsa 
mosque and Dome of the Rock, the former keys of destroyed homes, the 
stone-throwing youth, and Naji al-‘Ali’s rejected but defiant refugee child, 
Handala.68 
There is a noticeable divergence in wall graffiti content depending 
on the language of the script. English graffiti tends to evoke human rights 
discourses and international peace slogans, such as Mahatma Gandhi’s 
“An Eye for an Eye Makes the World Blind,” Nelson Mandela’s “Only Free 
Men Can Negotiate,” and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Injustice Anywhere 
Is a Threat to Justice Everywhere.” Yet reposts in Arabic often localize the 
struggle, with references to Palestinian poets and writers such as Mahmoud 
Darwish and Ghassan Kananafi, colloquial proverbs such as “Arabic is 
closer to the truth,” and defiant declarations such as Yasir Arafat’s statement 
“Jerusalem is ours; deal with it whether you like it or not.” This trend may 
appear as a simple binary between international/English and local/Arabic 
voices. Yet there is a cultural hybridity and linguistic fluidity born of the 
wall’s role as a global message board. English is increasingly the “language 
of protest” for those seeking to address Israel, the United States, and the 
international community.  
Nevertheless, distinctions in wall interventions are also apparent. 
There is a Western propensity to conflate the wall with the wider Palestinian 
struggle, historical experience, and broader concerns. At the same time, such 
interventions conceptualize wall resistance as part of a larger global struggle 
for freedom, therefore diminishing the local Palestinian voice. In Bethlehem, 
graffiti decries: “Israel, Have You Become the Evil You Deplored?” and “Israel, 
Is This What You Want to Be Remembered By?” and “Shame on You; Where 
Is Your Humanity?” and “The Oppressed Became the Oppressor.” There are 
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also those inscriptions that are more mocking in tone: “Here Is a Wall at 
Which to Weep” and “The Only Democracy in the Middle East.” Murals 
such as Ron English’s Pardon Our Oppression and images of Israeli soldiers 
made of money satirize US financial and military complicity. Graffiti texts 
affirm the notion that “American Money = Israeli Apartheid” or that “It’s 
Really Amazing What $7 Million Per Day From My Government Can Do.” 
Palestinian Arabic graffiti that address an Israeli audience do not 
appeal to its humanity or moral responsibility but rather condemn the 
legacy of brutal military occupation. A recurrent Arabic slogan found on 
the wall around al-Ram and al-‘Izariyya states “Take Your Share of Our 
Blood and Leave.” Defiance and resistance often flows through the rhe-
torical discourses of Palestinian politics. Texts on the wall include: “Fatah is 
Everywhere/Fatah is the Key to Resistance,” “Hamas: the Glory and Honor 
of Our Dear Martyrs and the Healing of Those Who are Injured” and “DFLP 
(Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine): Remembering All the 
Efforts and Resistance Against the Occupation and the Apartheid Wall.” 
Sprayed Palestinian political slogans and party emblems often affirm neigh-
borhood allegiances and territorial boundaries—demarcating geographical 
spheres of influence for Fatah, Hamas, and the DFLP. Yet other graffiti tags 
reveal complexities and strains within contemporary Palestinian politics. 
Some graffiti in al-Ram is forthright in both its critique of the current PA 
leadership––“Is this the government you elected?”––and its demand for 
Fatah and Hamas reconciliation––“Yes to National Unity.”  Other Arabic tags 
condemn peace negotiations––“No to Negotiations with the Continuation 
of Occupation and Judaization Procedures”––and call for a new uprising: 
“Yalla, Yalla, Intifada.”69
Alongside celebratory and critical political slogans, Palestinian graffiti 
also reflects on the Nakba (the 1948 “Catastrophe”), refugees, the right of 
return, and the centrality of Jerusalem to a future Palestinian state. At the 
Abu Dis/al-‘Izariyya junction, Arabic graffiti commemorates the sixty-first 
anniversary of the Nakba, listing the names of destroyed villages (such as 
‘Ayn Karam and Dayr Yasin). It also includes the refrains “Remember the 
National Refugees,” “We Will Be Back One Day,” and “The Right of Return 
Is a Holy Right and It Can’t Be Given Up.” Images of Jerusalem, depicted 
as the archetypal Arab city, or the sacred “al-Quds” housing the al-Aqsa 
Mosque utilize various artistic styles but each offer the same resolute message: 
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“Jerusalem is ours forever,” “We are not going to leave you, Jerusalem,” and 
simply “Return.”70 Similar to the walls encircling many Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, the wall is a visual memorial repository. It 
is a place to inscribe and commemorate loss and survival, to inform the 
world of the Palestinian story, and to remind future generations of their 
historical narrative. 
Arabic wall graffiti also highlights immediate and contemporary strug-
gles that touch the everyday lives of Palestinian Jerusalemites. One such 
emotive issue is the ongoing battle to protect the neighborhood of Silwan 
against Israeli settler encroachment through El’ad’s “City of David” heritage 
park.71 “Free Palestine” slogans have been coupled with “Free Silwan” tags. 
Attention is also given to liberating political prisoners, the plight of hunger 
strikers (such as Khadr ‘Adnan), stopping house demolitions, ending peace 
Figure 6: Al-Aqsa, Arafat and DFLP flags in -‘Izariyya. 
Image from May 2010, courtesy of CinC. 
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negotiations, and joining the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) 
campaign. A section of the wall in al-Ram targets the construction of the 
Jerusalem light railway and its sponsorship at the hands of the French mul-
tinational Veolia. The long-delayed railway project (2002–11) has aroused 
continued controversy over its route that links East Jerusalem settlements 
(French Hill and Pisget Ze’ev) to the urban center, sparking legal suits, and 
divestment pressure from Palestinian civil society organizations. The graf-
fiti implores, “Help Us Out, No More Illegal Investment in East Jerusalem 
Light Railway; Stop Veolia”; and “Veolia is Building the Newest Palestinian 
Railway. Not Meant for Palestinians, and Built on Stolen Land. Derailing the 
Peace Process and Leading Us Nowhere.” The BDS campaign’s international 
pressure finally led to a pyrrhic Palestinian victory, with Veolia selling its 
shares to the Israeli transport cooperative Egged in October 2010. The 
project was fully operative in 2012, however, and there are plans to extend 
the fourteen-kilometer track to over twenty-two kilometers including Neve 
Ya’akov in the north and to Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital in the southeast 
as part of the larger Jerusalem municipal “Master Plan 2020.”
Figure 7: “Return” in al-‘Izariyya/
Abu Dis. Image from May 2010, 
courtesy of CinC, May 2010. 
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Graffiti supporting the BDS campaign comes from both local and 
international activists reflecting the global nature of the movement. Here 
again, ambivalence on global civil society partnerships and the implicit 
power relations that underlie them are evident. One graffiti text defiantly 
echoes Aboriginal Australian activist Lilla Watson, “If You Have Come Here 
to Help Me, You are Wasting Your Time. But If You Have Come Because 
Your Liberation is Bound Up with Mine, Then Let us Work Together.” Other 
Palestinian graffiti tags directly challenge Western ignorance––“Foreigner 
You Know Shoah...But Why Don’t Know Nakba?” Others gently mock conflict 
tourism: “Don’t Worry, Take Photos.” A barbed graffiti message in Abu Dis, 
employing a hybrid of Arabic and English, questions whether activists are 
writing on the right side of the wall: “Oh Foreigners, We Need to Bring Our 
Protest Graffiti to the Other Side of the Wall.” Sami, a forty-year-old shop-
keeper in Bethlehem comments on these differing perspectives: “It is good 
that foreign tourists come to support the local people, but often they write 
what is in their heads [and] not exactly the thoughts of local Palestinians. 
They want the wall to fall, but they don’t understand the details of occupa-
tion. They fail to see the wider picture.”72
“Wall for Sale”: Economic Resistance
The wall continues to impose an incalculable economic drain on Palestinian 
Jerusalemites. At the same time, it has also led to incredible ingenuity, 
adaptability, and responsiveness. Observers have documented these forms 
of everyday resistance, such as the creation of dynamic micro-networks 
of “checkpoint” vendors, porters, and transport systems (buses and taxis). 
Adapting to the struggles of Palestinian daily movement, various entrepreneurs 
have created what some have dubbed “Qalandiya Duty Free,” named after a 
Palestinian village near a wall crossing between Jerusalem and Ramallah.73 
Another increasingly visible and creative means of visually sub-
verting the wall is its use as a space for commercial advertising, both for 
local businesses and global marketing. In the districts of al-Ram and al-
‘Izariyya (formerly thriving Palestinian commercial centers on main routes 
into central Jerusalem), the effects of the wall are profound. Only fifteen 
percent of al-Ram’s original inhabitants currently reside within the district, 
and al-‘Izariyya has witnessed a steady migration to East Jerusalem and 
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Ramallah. At the same time, lower rents have encouraged the return of some 
commercial life and with it an observable increase in the use of the wall 
to post advertisements, announce sales, or promote shops and businesses. 
Advertising in these districts has taken multiple forms. Shop owners, car 
wash services, and supermarkets whose properties directly face the wall use 
hand-sprayed messages to promote their products and prices. In certain 
places, the wall has become a notice board to promote local services such as 
renting construction equipment, the provision of gas, and wedding catering 
through the posting of names and mobile numbers. Finally, commercial 
signs, posters, banners, and billboards advertising beauty salons, graphic 
designers, furniture shops, musical concerts, and restaurants are fixed and 
bracketed at busy junctions along the wall.
Residents have varied responses and reactions to this phenomenon, 
revealing subtle differences in perspectives on the wall, the continuing 
Israeli occupation, and the PA. One shopkeeper in al-‘Izariyya observes 
a shift in the communal attitude from initial defiance to tacit acceptance: 
“At the beginning, slogans were about resistance and defying Israel. Then 
people started to use it like any other wall. They put up political posters, 
death notices, and advertisements. It feels wrong to have messages like ‘The 
Figure 8: Commercial advertisements on the wall in al-Ram. 
Image from March 2010, courtesy of CinC, March 2012. 
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Wall Must Fall’ next to taxi numbers, but I suppose life has to go on.”74 A 
political activist originally from Ramallah stresses that the most important 
point is surviving the wall, therefore all tactics and strategies are permis-
sible: “Advertising [on the wall] is only a natural response. How can we 
say this is right or wrong? It doesn’t matter about positions; it’s about the 
reality of life. The wall is there, and people use it for everyday functions. 
Nothing remains static.”75 
Other residents are keen to interpret all inscriptions on the wall whether 
political, social, or commercial as oppositional practice. As supermarket 
owner Amir explains: “All this graffiti that you see on the wall—even when 
it’s not political, it is not an act of adjustment. It’s an act of resistance.”76 In 
Bethlehem, the owner of the Bahamas Seafood restaurant, George Hasbun, 
concurs. The wall stands just yards from his restaurant, and he uses it to 
advertise his menu, project World Cup football matches, and promote his 
new souvenir shop, The Wall Gallery. His promotional shop placard, fixed 
to a wall opposite it, reads: “Lifeless and Concrete Stands the Wall––But 
the Wall Gallery Shines with Soul.” As Hasbun explains: 
Customers come to our restaurant as a way of challenging the wall. 
They liked the idea of putting a menu on the wall and using humor 
to defeat it.... We put up a screen to show the World Cup. Many local 
people came to watch the games. Perhaps we will do that again and 
show something else on the wall.77 
A further extension of such commercial “resistance” strategies or 
conflict tourism trends is the opening of a “Banksy Shop” adjacent to the 
Bethlehem wall. The shop sells a range of Banksy wall art transposed onto 
posters, T-shirts, refrigerator magnets, and olive woodcarvings.
Mustafa, the shop owner, points out: “I’m not sure Banksy knows 
about our shop, but I’m sure he would support it.” The shop stocks wall art 
memorabilia and organizes Banksy graffiti tours, which incorporate a visit 
to the ‘Aida or Dahaysha refugee camp and a discussion on local Palestinian 
challenges.78 According to Mustafa, the shop is both an act of economic 
resistance and a reflection of the wall’s growing political significance: 
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We realized there was an opportunity to make a living from the wall. 
It has taken so much from us; we must find new ways of surviving.... 
We are selling Banksy as this is what foreign tourists want. It’s what 
they come to look at.... The Wall has become an important place to 
make political points. Where were else can you be heard these days? 79
The Wall Gallery and Banksy Shop are undeniably creative and 
entrepreneurial responses to the Wall. For some Palestinians, they rep-
resent legitimate strategies of economic resistance; yet others view them 
as crude and kitsch commodification of the wall driven by the demands 
of “conflict tourists.” Spurgeon Thompson, writing on Northern Ireland’s 
“Troubles Tourism” warns of the dangers of “selling” conflict, which often 
leads to “the reduction of politics to visual commodities, the glance that 
consumes rather than investigates, the camera that collects rather than 
critiques...and the culture stripped of its social and political meanings.”80 
Indeed, many Palestinian residents remain wary of tourist practices that 
normalize the wall, reify its presence, and enable commercial exploitation. 
Ahmad, a print shop owner in al-Ram, is critical of what he perceives to be 
local apathy. “People go on living, without thinking about the future,” he 
comments. Ahmad points to government corruption: “There needs to be 
an intifada against the PA, negotiating with Israel and building their little 
kingdoms.”81 He is also critical of the wall’s commercialization:
Figure 9: Banksy’s unofficial shop, Bethlehem. Image from March 2012, courtesy of CinC.
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It angers me to see advertisements and personal numbers; are we 
turning this into a public noticeboard? And then foreign activists 
come and write slogans. That long one [referring to the longest letter 
in the world82] apparently took one month and cost 12,000 euros. 
For what exactly? What is the point of it? No one even reads what 
it says! People are poor here. Why not spend the money on schools, 
infrastructure, [and] hospitals?83
Finally, the wall has also become an iconic global message board 
for international greetings, solidarity support, and worldwide advertising. 
It provides a striking symbolic backdrop for endorsing websites (such 
as Australian Jewelers Support Palestine: ejeweller.com.au), publicizing 
humanitarian blogs (including This Wall is a Symbol of Human Failure: 
Lifeisbrutallyunfair.com), and promoting international events (such as 
the Toronto Palestinian Film Festival in November 2008). Foreign and 
international activists have sprayed many of these graffiti tags. Almost 
two thousand, however, are the work of the joint Dutch-Palestinian non-
governmental organization “Sendmeamessage.” This collaborative initiative 
was created in 2005 to enable anyone to post a message on the wall via an 
Internet site. The “You Pay, We Spray” project entailed a thirty euro donation 
used to support grassroots charities and involved Palestinian volunteers 
spraying the electronically received personal messages on the wall and 
then sending the recipient three digital images of the graffiti. According 
to one of its founders, Faris ‘Aruri, the focus of the project was “marketing 
Palestine globally to present the Palestinian struggle to the world using 
creative and new forms.”84 
The content of the messages range from the political to the banal: 
critiques of Israeli occupation, marriage proposals, subversive humor 
(“Nipping over the Wall; Do You Want Anything from the Red Shop?”), 
peace slogans, birthday greetings, and expressions of commercial solidarity 
(such as “Hookahs, Not Bazookas,” the tag of a Californian café Casbahcafe). 
Some may question whether this is marketing the Palestinian struggle glob-
ally or simply providing space for international voices to inscribe their own 
meaning on the wall and thus sanitizing the occupation. The project has 
stirred much debate and controversy, with some residents critiquing the 
obscure and irrelevant interventions and others voicing objections over its 
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financing. Yet for ‘Aruri (one of the “You Pay, We Spray” project founders, 
mentioned above) the project was never a commercial enterprise. “We are 
activists, not commercial entrepreneurs,” he comments. Instead, the focus, 
he argues, was on “creating global media exposure and stirring internal 
debate.” He explains further: 
Look, we still have critiques. There are too many café intellectuals and 
activists in Palestine, but what do they actually do or achieve? This is 
a form of resistance, but the main goal is opening up public opinion. 
Liberation movements have many different strands and colors; we are 
looking for creative and new forms. People particularly among the 
youth are frustrated and disillusioned with Palestinian leaders and 
politics; they repeat the same thing and no one listens. Our project 
got a two-page spread on Time magazine. When was the last time any 
Palestinian leader got such coverage?85
‘Aruri’s analysis of resistance reveals a growing youthful disenchant-
ment with Palestinian activism and political actors and a concerted emphasis 
on raising international awareness and building solidarity links through 
global media. Wall graffiti takes key Palestinian debates from cafés and 
offices to public streets, communities, and international media. For many 
Jerusalemites, this form of resistance remains the only viable option, given 
how vulnerable they are to the Israeli state and the PA and to the inertia 
of Palestinian politics. 
A recent twist on this form of activism is the Sumud Story House. 
The Arab Education Institute (AEI) in Bethlehem leads this collaborative 
initiative, which posts Palestinian women’s stories on the wall. Personal 
accounts of sumud emerge from community gatherings. These are translated 
into individual English posters sponsored by international beneficiaries and 
then posted as part of a living “Wall Museum.” One of the thirty current 
posters in this series reads: 
I am a dying woman
All my life was in Jerusalem! I was there daily. I worked there at a school 
as a volunteer, and all my friends live there. I used to belong to the 
Anglican Church in Jerusalem and was a volunteer there...I rented a 
flat but was not allowed to stay because I do not have a Jerusalem ID 
card. Now I cannot go to Jerusalem; the Wall separates me from my 
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church, from my life. We are imprisoned here in Bethlehem. All my 
relationships with Jerusalem are dead. I am a dying woman.
Antoinette from Bethlehem
Supported by Martin Kofflard, Rotterdam, Netherlands.86
While this project focuses on using the wall as a global medium, it 
projects Palestinian voices and struggles rather than international interven-
tions. The objective is not merely media exposure. In the words of the AEI 
website, such events and projects “are an activation of social space and by 
their adjacency to the wall (in fact the wall becomes a ‘stage’), they underline 
the contrasts between community life versus the message of suffocation and 
fragmentation emitted by the wall.”87 This project perhaps uses the wall as a 
local stage, but the exclusive use of English suggests the intended audience 
remains international. One participant admitted that the posters are “my 
letter to the world.” But she also said, “I don’t think the world is listening.”88 
Conclusion: Between Resistance and Sumud
The wall is perhaps Israel’s most costly political venture, both in terms of 
financial expenditure (around 1.5 to two billion dollars) and in the nega-
tive international publicity it has generated. It has evoked historical images 
of South African apartheid and emerged as the defining icon for Israel’s 
ongoing occupation and oppression of the Palestinian people. Visual images 
of wall graffiti and protest art have become a symbol of local resistance and 
a medium for projecting global struggles against colonialism, exploitation, 
and capitalist greed. Palestinian Jerusalemites treat wall graffiti with ambiva-
lence and indifference. While some laud its importance in globalizing the 
Palestinian cause, others warn of the danger of losing their distinct voice. 
Some dismiss graffiti tags, posters, and advertisements as trivializing and 
normalizing the monstrous concrete intrusion. Disillusioned youth point to 
the graffiti’s importance in expressing their existence and venting their anger. 
Wall artists attest to the paradoxical predicaments of Palestinians and 
the different audiences they hope to address. The local commercial adver-
tisements reflect the struggle to maintain a viable livelihood in fractured 
neighborhoods, while the English-language protest murals and slogans point 
to a growing belief that only international awareness, solidarity, and global 
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pressure will influence Israel’s current policies.  What emerges from the 
cacophony of opinions is a deeper debate over the very nature and limita-
tions of resistance within Jerusalem. Few Jerusalem ID holders currently 
believe there is any prospect for meaningful political opposition in the 
city or that there is an appetite for popular resistance. Instead, they prefer 
to emphasize the importance of personal sumud, remaining steadfast and 
persistent in the face of difficult circumstances. As Rami, a fifty-year old 
shop owner from Shaykh Jarrah, explains:
When the wall was being built in Jerusalem, we went over to protests 
in Abu Dis and al-Ram. We thought maybe we could change some-
thing. But now we feel defeated. There is no point [in] going to these 
protests, we have too much to lose.... What does resistance mean these 
days? I’ll tell you what it means—survival. Being willing to stay and 
not leave for Ramallah or another country—that’s the greatest act of 
resistance (sumud) for East Jerusalemites.89
For Rami, the concept of sumud is particularly relevant to the daily 
Jerusalemite struggle to survive and exist within the city.90 Birzeit professor 
Mazin Qumsiyeh explicates sumud as simply “hanging on to what remains 
and doing all the mundane tasks of trying to live (survive) in what remains 
of Palestine when it has been made crystal clear in words and deeds that 
we are not welcome on our lands.”91
Such a conceptualization of sumud may be broad enough to allow all 
Palestinians to feel engaged in resistance: “To exist is to resist.” Just how 
malleable, however, can the application of sumud be within the context of 
Jerusalem? Should it be applied to Palestinian communities who have lost 
faith with the PA or even the national project and who instead are striving 
for equal civil rights and public services from the Israeli municipal authori-
ties? A November 2010 Petcher Middle East Poll of nineteen East Jerusalem 
neighborhoods found that in a theoretical two-state solution, only thirty 
percent would choose Palestinian citizenship, while thirty-five percent 
would prefer Israeli citizenship, and a similar number would be undecided.92 
These figures may attest to a number of trends: the disorientation of East 
Jerusalemites, the failure of the peace process and the dissipation of PA 
credibility, and the latent Jerusalemite fear of losing access to their city, the 
holy sites, and Israeli social benefits. Importantly, the poll also indicates 
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a swing away from an exclusively politically and nationally framed solu-
tion to a new emphasis on pursuing civil rights within the Israeli system. 
Presently, Palestinian Jerusalemites may be more concerned with their 
standard of living than with the state in which they live. In the words of 
Amira, a twenty-year-old student activist:
The whole struggle is about freedom and rights. The PLO’s support of 
the two-state solution is foundational; yet the aspirations of individuals 
are not fully contained within such a manifesto. They want peace, 
prosperity, freedom, [and] civil rights. They are not so concerned 
with the national burden [or] the return of refugees; their focus is on 
their own needs and interests—the issue has become individualized.93
Such sentiments resonate with the controversial proposals of Palestinian 
intellectual Sari Nusseibeh in his latest book, What Is a Palestinian State 
Worth? In the book Nusseibeh suggests that East Jerusalem may be an interim 
model for a broader Palestinian solution in which Israel is forced to confer on 
Palestinians full “civil [and human rights], though not the political rights of 
citizenship.”94 Nusseibeh’s is a provocative premise—that Palestinians may 
be willing to accept “second-class citizenship” over their current occupied 
status or a “future make-believe Palestinian state.”95 In his urban critique 
of East Jerusalem, Al-Quds University professor ‘Umar Yusuf is hesitant 
to suggest a shift towards “normalization” but instead posits the idea of a 
“normalization of resistance.” He suggests that Palestinians within Jerusalem 
have been forced to adapt, modify, and rethink their spaces of activity and 
their opportunities, with everyday urban concerns of housing, education, 
and commerce becoming the new arenas for civil resistance against the 
Israeli authorities. “The essence of Palestinian sumud has been resistance 
by existence; improving living conditions is becoming a vital necessity for 
a vibrant Palestinian presence in Jerusalem and a crucial milestone for the 
aspirations towards a Palestinian capital.”96 Such varying interpretations 
cannot detract from the overriding fact that Palestinian Jerusalemites are 
being forced to find new ways and creative strategies to challenge Israeli 
hegemony over the city. 
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